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Skilled migrants typically contribute to the welfare state more than they draw in benefits from it. The
opposite holds for unskilled migrants. This suggests that a host country is likely to boost (respectively,
curtail) its welfare system when absorbing high-skill (respectively, low-skill) migration. In this paper
we first examine this hypothesis in a politico-economic setup. We then confront the prediction of the
theory with evidence. In doing so, we reckon with an endogeneity problem that arise because the skill
composition of migration is itself affected by the generosity of the welfare state.
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Skilled migrants typically contribute to the welfare state (in tax payments)
more than they receive from it. The opposite is true in the case of unskilled
migrants who typically impose a net ￿scal burden on the welfare state. In-
deed, in 1997 the U.S. National Research Council sponsored a study on the
overall ￿scal impact of immigration into the U.S.; see Smith and Edmonston
(1997). The study looks carefully at all layers of government (federal, state,
and local), all programs (bene￿ts), and all types of taxes. The ￿ndings sug-
gest that migrants with less than high school education are typically a net
￿scal burden that can reach as high as approximately US$ 100,000 in present
value, when the migrants￿age on arrival is between 20-30 years1. On the
other hand, a young migrant, aged approximately 20 years on arrival, with
more than high-school education, is expected to make a positive net ￿scal
contribution of approximately US$ 300,000 in present value.
The aforementioned ￿ndings suggest that a host country is likely to boost
its welfare system when absorbing high-skill migration, and curtail it when
absorbing low-skill migration.2 Hence, as the skill composition of immigrants
decreases, the ￿scal leakage to the new comers increases (at the expense of the
domestics). This may induce a reduction of the welfare-state expenditure.
This is indeed the hypothesis that is studied in this paper (see also Razin,
Sadka and Swagel (2002)).
We ￿rst develop a parsimonious model in which the extent of the wel-
fare state is determined by majority voting. We then study how the skill
composition of a given migration volume a⁄ects the politico-economic equi-
1See also Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) for a further analysis of these ￿ndings.
Storesletten (2000) calibrated a general-equilibrium, overlapping generations model to
capture the e⁄ects of in￿ ows of working age immigrants to the U.S. on the ￿scal system,
taking into account changes in factor prices.
2For a recent comprehensive survey of the economic consequences of migration see
Hanson (2008).
2librium level of the welfare state. Indeed, the parsimonious model con￿rms
this hypothesis.
We then turn to study some evidence on the e⁄ect of migration on the
generosity of the welfare state. In doing so we have to deal with some se-
rious endogeneity problems. Note that the skill composition of migrants
may indeed a⁄ect the generosity of welfare state, as our model suggests, but
this generosity itself may a⁄ect the skill composition of migrants, as in Co-
hen and Razin (2008). To overcome this endogeneity problem, we adopt a
twofold identi￿cation strategy. First, we employ instrumental variables that
are commonly used in gravity models - whether or not the source and host
country share a common language and the distance between them - for high-
and low-skill migration. Second, as shown in Cohen and Razin (2008), when
estimating the e⁄ect of generosity of the welfare state on the skill composi-
tion of immigrants, one must account for di⁄erent (source-host country pairs)
migration regimes. Speci￿cally, when migration is policy-controlled, the host
country can react to low-skill dominated immigration pressures not only by
curtailing welfare state bene￿ts (as suggested herein) but also by controlling
the skill composition of the immigrants, via screening migration policy or
limiting access to some welfare bene￿ts3. To capture the full e⁄ect of the
skill composition of migrants on the welfare state, therefore, we focus only in
a sample of countries that enable free migration among themselves, as well
as equal treatment of the welfare system for domestic and migrants.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section describes
the analytical framework. Section 3 provides the empirical evidence. Section
3EU countries speci￿cally favor their domestic and EU-originated migrants over non-
EU-originated migrants - within the labor markets (Brucker et al. (2002). Possibly,
denying welfare eligibility is also a possiblity to control migration (see Sinn (2004)) . In
this case, a low composition of skills among immigrants, who may not be eligible to all
welfare bene￿ts, impose a much less burden upon the ￿scal system of the host country.
Hence the leakage is smaller, thus the expected reduction of the tax-welfare program is
smaller, if at all.
34 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
We employ a parsimonious model of the welfare state, where migration is
exogenous, whereas the extent of redistribution is determined in a politico-
economic equilibrium.4 In particular, we consider the volume of migration,
￿, and its skill composition, ￿, as the exogenous variables, and we let the
native-born voters choose the tax rate, ￿; and, consequently, the generosity
of the welfare state (the per-capita spending, b).5 We then ask how an
exogenous change in the skill composition of the migrants, ￿, a⁄ect the chosen
parameters of the welfare state, ￿ and b.






u ; 0 < ￿ < 1 (1)
where Y is the GDP, A denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and
Li denotes the input of skilled and unskilled labor i, where i = fs;ug.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are given, respec-
tively, by these marginal products:
ws = ￿Y=Ls (2)
wu = (1 ￿ ￿)Y=Lu
Aggregate labor supplies of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively,
4This model was ￿rst employed in Cohen and Razin (2008).
5This setup di⁄ers from the one employed in Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) in two
main features: First, considers both skilled and unskilled migrants; Second, it allows
migration to a⁄ect wages.
6This parsimonious model is developed with the cross-section data is mind. The mi-
gration variable is the stock of migrants; not ￿ ows (as relevant for dynamic analysis).
4are given by:
Ls = (s + ￿￿)ls (3)
Lu = (1 ￿ s + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)lu
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native born is normal-
ized to 1; s denotes the share of native born skilled in the total native born
labor supply; ￿ denotes the share of skilled migrants in the total number of
migrants; ￿ denotes the total number of migrants; and li is the labor supply
of an individual with skill-level i.
Total population (native born and immigrants) is:
N = 1 + ￿ (4)
We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional labor
income tax of the rate ￿, with the revenues are spent equally on all residents
(native born and migrants alike) in the form of public services such as ed-
ucation, health, etc., that are distributed to all workers, regardless of their
contribution to the tax revenues.
The government budget constraint is:
Nb = ￿Y (5)
The utility of an individual of skill-type i is:






i + g(b) (6)
where ci denotes private consumption of an individual with skill-type i, " > 0,
and g(b) denotes the utility generated by the per capita public spending. We
further assume that gp(0) ! 1 (an Inada condition), so that all individuals
(skilled and unskilled) would like the government to levy some taxes in order
to provide some positive level of b.
The budget constraint of an individual with skill level i is:
ci = (1 ￿ ￿)liwi (7)
5Individual utility maximization yields the following labor supply equa-
tion:
li = (wi (1 ￿ ￿))
" (8)
It is then straightforward to calculate the equilibrium wages for the skilled













where ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿
and ￿ ￿
1 ￿ s + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
s + ￿￿
In order to ensure that the skilled wage always exceeds the unskilled wage,
ws > wu, we assume that
￿(1 ￿ s)
(1 ￿ ￿)(s + ￿)
> 1 (10)
We now use this model to analyze the politico-economic choice of the
welfare state variables, ￿ and b. This choice is done by majority voting.
Given that there is essentially only one independent choice variable in this
voting (note that once one of the variables - ￿;b - is chosen, the other is
determined by the budget constraint, equation (5)), the outcome of the voting
is determined by the choice of the median voter.
For this purpose, note that the indirect utility of a native-born individual
of skill level i = s;u is given by:
Vi (￿;￿) = g (b(￿;￿)) +
1
1 + "
[(1 ￿ ￿)wi (￿)]
1+" (11)
where ￿ is suppressed.
Note that wi does not depend on ￿ due to the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation
of the production function; see equation (9).
An individual of a skill type i opts for a tax rate ￿i which maximizes her







￿ wi [(1 ￿ ￿)wi]
" = 0 (12)
6for each i = s;u. Note also that the second-order condition is
@2Vi
@￿2 ￿ 0.
Because ws > wu, it follows from equation (12) that @Vu
@￿ > 0 when @Vs
@￿ =
0. Thus, as expected, an unskilled opts for a more generous welfare state (a
higher tax rate, ￿) than the skilled voter. This implies that the outcome of
the voting is determined by the median voter, whether skilled or unskilled.
The e⁄ect of a change in the skill composition of migrants on the gen-
erosity of the welfare state preferred by the individual of skill level i = s;u









Because of the second-order condition,
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for i = s;u. In Appendix A we show that @2Vs
@￿@￿ > 0 and that @2Vu
@￿@￿ > 0.7
Therefore, we can conclude that
d￿i
d￿
￿ 0 for both i = s;u: (15)
That is, the two types of voters (skilled and unskilled) opt for more generous
welfare state, re￿ ected in a higher ￿ and b, when the skill composition of
migration shifts more towards the skilled migrants (higher ￿). Host coun-
tries with relatively more skilled migrants choose to have a more generous
welfare system. This result follows because skilled migrants are net ￿scal
contributors, that is, their tax payments exceed what the welfare state spend
on them. The hypothesis derived in this section is confronted with data in
the next section.
3 Empirical Evidence
This section provides empirical evidence to the hypothesis that a higher pro-
portion of skilled migrants has a positive e⁄ect on the welfare-state generosity
7More precisely, we show that this result holds, respectively, at the level of ￿ that each
skill type would have chosen, if given this option.
7of the host country, when this generosity is determined in majority voting
(regardless of whether the median voter is skilled or unskilled).
3.1 Econometric Model
Assume that welfare-state per-capita spendings in country i is determined
according to the following equation:





where b is the welfare state per-capita spendings, ms and mu denote the
stocks of skilled and unskilled migrants, respectively; Xb is a vector of other
control variables and ￿b is an the error term. The respective coe¢ cients of
these variables are depicted by ￿s, ￿s, and ￿.
Note that there is an endogeneity problem concerning equation (16). It is
di¢ cult to identify the direction of causality between spendings, bi, and mi-
gration of the two types. Indeed the m￿ s a⁄ect b as speci￿ed in this equation.
But, on the other hand, the generosity of the welfare state also a⁄ects the
level of migrations of the two types. Speci￿cally, as demonstrated in Cohen
and Razin (2008), the generosity of the welfare state has a negative e⁄ect on
the migration of skilled individuals (who are net ￿scal contributors), but a
positive e⁄ect on the migration of unskilled (who are net ￿scal bene￿ciaries),
when migration is free.8
We therefore introduce instrumental variables for the two skill types of
migrants. We assume that bilateral migration stocks for skill level e = (s;u),
between any source-host country pair (j;i), are determined in accordance
with the following equation:




j;i, e = fs;ug (17)
where Comlang depicts a dummy variable, with the value 1 if the source and
host countries share a common language, and 0 otherwise, Dist captures the
8An additional, opposite, e⁄ect exists when the welfare state can control the volume
and skill composition of migration, as between EU and non-EU countries.
8geographical (great circle) distance between the source-host pair, Xm is a
vector of other control variables (note that it may be pairwise speci￿c (which
further helps the identi￿cation), hence the di⁄erent superscript) and ￿m is an
error term.
Our identi￿cation strategy is twofold. First, the distance and common
language variables (that are excluded from equation (16)) serve as instrumen-
tal variables. That is, we assume that these variables are not correlated with
the error term in equation (16). On the other hand, it is quite plausible and
well established that these variables a⁄ect migration, as in all gravity models.
(A similar approach was ￿rst employed by Frankel and Romer (1999) who
studied the e⁄ect of trade on growth.) Second, we employ a sample of EU
countries (and countries who have treaties with the EU) within which there
is free migration and equal treatment of native and foreign born alike. This
enables us to estimate the e⁄ect of migration￿ s skill on welfare generosity
when the host country cannot take alternative measures to cope with the
possible ￿scal burden, as embodied within low-skill migration.9
Estimating equations (17) yields the ￿tted values for the bilateral skill-






where the hat symbol denotes the ￿tted value estimation.
Therefore, our estimated equation is:





9When the host country can control the volume and skill composition of its immigrants,
extensive welfare state spendings can be sustained by a screening migration policy which
favors the skilled over the unskilled. Therefore, when facing an unskilled migration pres-
sures, the host country can deal with that without curtailing the welfare state bene￿ts,
but simply by not allowing these migrants into the country or denying their access to some
of the bene￿ts.
93.2 Data
Our country sample includes 16 European countries, 14 EU members (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the U.K.), as well as Norway
and Switzerland. Naturally there is free labor mobility among the (old mem-
bers) EU countries. The two other countries enjoy bilateral agreements with
the EU, ensuring free labor mobility. (See Cohen and Razin (2008) for de-
tailed description of the free labor mobility treaties among countries in this
sample.)
The dependent variable, b, is social expenditure, in cash or in kind, per
capita, at constant (2000) prices, PPP converted into US$, averaged between
2000 and 2005 (source: OECD.stat). The averaging is done in order to
￿lter out business-cycle variations. Social expenditure encompass all kinds
of social public expenditures, in cash or in kind, including, for instance,
old age transfers, incapacity related bene￿ts, health care, unemployment
compensations and other social expenditures.
The stocks of migrants in either country, originated in all of the remaining
countries, by education attainment, is our variables of interest. Migrants are
at working age (25+), de￿ned as foreign born, subdivided into three classes
of schooling years: low (0-8), medium (9-12) and high (13+). The stocks
of migrants we use are lagged (1990) to further avoid possible endogeneity
problem (source: Docquier and Marfouk (2006)).
We control for the domestic labor force for each skill level in each coun-
try in 2000 (source: Docquier and Marfouk (2006)). This control variable is
essential in light of the fact that we employ the number of migrants rather
than their proportions as the variable of interest. It also captures the relative
power of the di⁄erent interests groups, as manifested in the politico-economic
equilibrium, and the e⁄ect of migration on wages. Additionally, we include
GDP per capita, PPP adjusted to US$ in constant prices (2000), averaged
10between 2000 and 2004 (source: Penn World Tables 6.2). Normally, as a
country￿ s production is higher, its ability to dispense welfare-state per-capita
spendings is higher. Given that the GDP per capita is potentially correlated
with migration stocks, as potential income measure, its inclusion is neces-
sary. We also control for old age (65+) share in the population, averaged
between 2000 and 2007 (source: U.S. Census Bureau, International). Pen-
sion bene￿ts captures a vast portion of the welfare-state spending; thus, this
variable should be highly positively correlated with the dependent variable,
and therefore should be included as a control variable.10
3.3 Results
The results of the regression are described in Table (1):
OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -17.532 45.506
(8.348)* (17.015)**
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.866 -7.011
(0.245)*** (2.627)**
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 368.13 433.613
(58.054)*** (84.725)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 521.675 557.530
(137.087)*** (108.549)***
Domestic high-skilled (2000) 0.045 -0.401
-0.109 (0.178)*




2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: benefits per capita (2000-2005)
Table 1: The e⁄ect of Skill Composition of Migrants on Welfare-State Spend-
ings
Consider ￿rst the ￿rst column. Migrants with high (low) education level
10Given the small number of observations (16), we must focus on the two variables
of interests (b ms;i andb mu;i) and employ only the few most important exogenous control
variables.
11have a negative (positive) e⁄ect on the welfare-state spendings in the host
countries. This result could be due to reverse causality (despite the lagging of
migration stocks): higher spendings reduce the skill composition of migration
in free migration regimes (Cohen and Razin (2008)).
The second column employs the ￿tted migration stocks from the ￿rst
stage regression (equation (17)). The result is exactly opposite: high (low)
skilled migrants have a positive (negative) e⁄ect on the level of welfare state
spendings. This is in line with the conclusions of our parsimonious model.
Host country adopts a more generous welfare system when high-skill migrants
(who are net ￿scal contributors) enter the country. The opposite applies in
the case of low-skill migration: the host country is reluctant to increase
its welfare generosity when such migrants (who are net ￿scal bene￿ciaries)
arrive.
3.4 Robustness
We check the robustness of our results in several manners. First, we replace
the skill composition of the migrants. We commence by exploring the e⁄ect
of medium-skill (high school education) and low-skill (elementary school ed-
ucation) migrants on the welfare generosity of their host country. Then we
combine the medium- and low-skill migrants into one group versus the high
skilled (above high school education). The results are very similar to our
main ￿ndings above (see Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix B).
Secondly, we replace the dependent variable. Instead of using the average
between 2000 and 2005, we use averages in broader periods (1995-2005, 1990-
2005, 1985-2005 and 1980-2005). Alternatively, we use a di⁄erent measure for
governmental spending on welfare: we take the average tax rate and multiply
it by the GDP per capita, yielding thereby a measure of the average tax
revenues per capita. From this measure we subtract the product of defense
expenses as percentage of the GDP and the GDP per capita (which yields a
measure of the defense expenses per capita). All the results are consistent
12with our primary ￿nding. That is, when employing the instrumental variable
estimation, high-skill migrants induce enlargement of the welfare state (as
opposed to OLS estimation which captures the reverse causality); low-skill
migrants induce the reduction of the welfare state, although not all results
are as statistically signi￿cant as in the main estimation (see Tables 4,5 and
6 in Appendix B)
Thirdly, we use di⁄erent speci￿cations of the estimated model (equation
(19)). We start by incorporating the Gini coe¢ cient (before tax-transfers).
This measure of inequality is expected to be positively correlated with the
generosity of the welfare state. We then account for cultural a¢ nity towards
welfare and social rights, by using the legal origin of the countries. Countries
whose legal origin is English (like the U.K. or Ireland) are traditionally more
protective of property rights than social rights, relatively to countries with
French-German origin, or Scandinavian origin. Finally, we control for un-
employment rates of the host countries. We expect the unemployment rate
to be positively correlated with the measure of welfare spending. All results
further validate our hypothesis (see Tables 7, 8 and 9 in Appendix B).
4 Conclusion
Skilled migrants typically contribute to the welfare state more than they
draw in bene￿ts from it. The opposite holds for unskilled migrants. This
suggests that a host country is likely to boost (respectively, curtail) its welfare
system when absorbing high-skill (respectively, low-skill) migration. In this
paper we examined this hypothesis. We ￿rst constructed a parsimonious
politico-economic model. We showed that indeed a higher proportion of
skilled migration for a given volume of migration encourages a host country
to opt for a more generous welfare state system. We then confronted this
prediction with evidence from EU countries. In doing so, we reckon with an
endogeneity problem that arise because the skill composition of migration is
13itself a⁄ected by the generosity of the welfare state. We indeed found that the
evidence supports the prediction of the theory. Furthermore, if one ignores
this endogeneity problem (and employs OLS estimation) the estimates of the
e⁄ects of the skilled and unskilled migration on the generosity of the welfare
state are severely biased, so much so as to reverse the direction of these
e⁄ects.
We conjecture that in the same parsimonious model a brain drain from
the source country will push it towards curtailing the extent of its welfare
system. A useful direction for future research is to confront this hypothesis
with evidence.
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In Cohen and Razin (2008) it is shown that when g is linear (more pre-
cisely, gp = 1 and gq = 0), then the expression in equation (20) is positive
in the vicinity of @Vi=@￿ = 0; that is at the level of ￿ most preferred by an
individual of skill level i = s;u. In fact, the reason why we made g nonlinear
with gp (0) ! 1 is to ensure that all skill types would prefer a positive level
of government spending (an Inada condition). But it is quite plausible to
make g approximately linear beyond a very small level of b and that b is
perfectly substitutable to private consumption (that is, gp = 1 and gq = 0).





High skilled migrants (1990) -6.287 26.325
(3.085)* (11.781)*
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.210 -7.426
(0.188)*** (3.541)*
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 379.862 410.406
(63.505)*** (82.132)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 581.111 399.920
(120.049)*** (112.922)***
Domestic med-skilled (2000) -0.024 -0.063
(0.018) (0.028)**




2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Dependent variable: benefits per capita (2000-2005)
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Robustness: Medium- vs. Low-skilled
OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -21.768 49.632
(9.080)** (17.571)**
Medium-Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.869 -6.094
(0.398)*** (2.294)**
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 365.327 433.934
(56.684)*** (85.087)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 503.101 593.742
(143.144)*** (114.168)***
Domestic med-skilled (2000) 0.077 -0.404
(0.115) (0.177)**




2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Dependent variable: benefits per capita (2000-2005)
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Robustness: High vs. Medium-low-skilled
17OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -16.667 47.365 -14.530 44.525
(9.442) (18.534)** (11.335) (20.411)*
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.980 -6.672 1.946 -6.043
(0.283)*** (3.030)* (0.339)*** (3.763)
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 374.372 427.927 360.927 407.284
(63.088)*** (92.659)*** (70.980)*** (113.945)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 557.052 593.406 559.026 586.002
(151.257)*** (132.101)*** (179.440)** (159.413)***
Domestic high-skilled (2000) 0.035 -0.417 0.014 -0.394
(0.117) (0.191)* (0.139) (0.206)*
Domestic low-skilled (2000) -0.056 0.059 -0.057 0.049
(0.016)*** (0.048) (0.019)** (0.059)
Observations 16 16 16 16
R-squared 0.867 0.819 0.817 0.774
2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
1995-2005 1990-2005
Dependent variable: benefits per capita
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Robustness: Di⁄erent Average of the Bene￿ts
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -13.401 42.919 -12.181 39.637
(11.831) (20.596)* (12.193) (20.467)*
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.911 -5.625 1.788 -4.850
(0.332)*** (3.906) (0.326)*** (3.942)
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 359.515 399.841 358.796 386.988
(71.559)*** (117.620)*** (66.613)*** (112.629)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 553.145 577.039 547.650 572.696
(177.261)** (157.583)*** (173.751)** (155.899)***
Domestic high-skilled (2000) -0.008 -0.395 -0.021 -0.379
(0.147) (0.207)* (0.151) (0.206)*
Domestic low-skilled (2000) -0.054 0.045 -0.052 0.033
(0.018)** (0.062) (0.016)*** (0.064)
Observations 16 16 16 16
R-squared 0.812 0.771 0.819 0.782
2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: benefits per capita
1985-2005 1980-2005
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Table 5: Robustness: Di⁄erent Measure of the Bene￿ts
18OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) 5.057 105.361
(39.165) (45.259)**
Low skilled migrants (1990) 2.562 -4.258
(1.622) (6.543)
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 509.746 389.185
(116.065)*** (168.228)**
Old age share (2000-2007) 391.386 511.042
(244.199) (305.853)
Domestic high-skilled (2000) -0.298 -1.096
(0.371) (0.460)**




2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Dependent variable: GDPpc * (tax rate - defense pc)
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Robustness: Di⁄erent Measure of the Bene￿ts
OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -18.807 49.465
(9.144)* (15.954)**
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.916 -7.059
(0.303)*** (2.630)**
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 366.775 418.696
(58.073)*** (88.375)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 533.445 427.161
(150.391)*** (119.470)***
Domestic high-skilled (2000) 0.063 -0.481
(0.119) (0.174)**
Domestic low-skilled (2000) -0.053 0.053
(0.018)** (0.036)




2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Dependent variable: benefits per capita (2000-2005)
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7: Robustness: Including Gini Coe¢ cient
19OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -12.862 59.231
(9.671) (16.883)***
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.741 -5.283
(0.528)** (2.527)*
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 321.299 257.661
(75.802)*** (143.321)
Old age share (2000-2007) 457.474 401.993
(194.730)* (134.737)**
Domestic high-skilled (2000) 0.030 -0.482
(0.097) (0.146)**
Domestic low-skilled (2000) -0.038 0.033
(0.019)* (0.024)
English legal origin -81.775 -1,779.475
(708.103) (571.628)**




Benchmark legal origin is French-German
2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Dependent variable: benefits per capita (2000-2005)
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Robustness: Adding Legal Origin
OLS 2SLS
High skilled migrants (1990) -14.948 48.865
(9.521) (18.134)**
Low skilled migrants (1990) 1.998 -5.921
(0.375)*** (3.233)
GDP per capita (2000-2004) 387.402 474.927
(61.117)*** (98.614)***
Old age share (2000-2007) 592.595 717.591
(187.959)** (124.663)***
Domestic high-skilled (2000) 0.003 -0.473
(0.128) (0.175)**
Domestic low-skilled (2000) -0.069 0.023
(0.026)** (0.052)




2SLS uses distance and common language as IV
Dependent variable: benefits per capita (2000-2005)
all variables are in thousands, except for Old age share (in %)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9: Robustness: Adding Unemployment
20